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DOMESTIC AIRLINE MERGERS AND DEFINING THE
RELEVANT MARKET: FROM CITIES TO AIRPORTS
ALEXA NAUMOVICH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, more than four billion people in the world used avia-
tion to travel.1 Airlines within the United States transported 741
million passengers domestically.2 As passenger demand for air
travel has risen astronomically, the number of airlines who serve
domestic passengers has dwindled to five major U.S. airlines.3
This shift in the airline industry and the reduced number of
domestic airlines requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) Anti-
trust Division (Antitrust Division) to alter its analysis of airline
mergers to determine their anticompetitive ramifications.
This article serves as guidance for the future of airline merg-
ers within the United States. It argues city-pairs should not pro-
vide the only method of defining the relevant market and that
airports should be included in the relevant market determina-
tion. To accomplish this, Part II will provide the background of
antitrust law and the airline industry by describing the historical
development of the governing legal rules and the Antitrust Divi-
sion’s oversight of merger law. Part III will discuss the develop-
ment of defining the relevant market in airline mergers by
* J.D. cum laude from SMU Dedman School of Law, 2018; B.A. in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from University of Arkansas,
2011. The author would like to thank those who gave their assistance with this
article and would also like to thank her family for their support.
1 2017 Marked by Strong Passenger Demand, Record Load Factor, INT’L AIR TRANSP.
ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2018-02-01-
01.aspx [https://perma.cc/PM58-6YF6].
2 BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, DEP’T OF TRANSP., BTS 12-18, 2017 Annual
and December U.S. Airline Traffic Data, https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2017-
annual-and-december-us-airline-traffic-data [https://perma.cc/9BBD-TQ4Z]
(last updated Mar. 15, 2018).
3 Simon Kurash, Note, Airline Consolidation: A Study of the American–US Airways
Merger, Other Major Mergers from the Past Two Decades, and Their Effect on Consumers,
48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 898 (2015).
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analyzing the evolving approach the agency has taken to airline
mergers over the past twenty-five years. Part IV will critique the
current ways of defining the relevant market within airline
mergers, and Part V will provide suggestions for determining
the relevant market and alternative ways to assess entry barriers.
II. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust concerns in the aviation industry arose after the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978 (Deregulation Act).4 Prior to der-
egulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) controlled and
regulated any consolidation, merger, or acquisition of control of
any air carrier.5 Approval by the CAB granted automatic federal
antitrust immunity for the airline industry.6 The Deregulation
Act eliminated the automatic federal antitrust immunity, sub-
jecting the airline industry to federal antitrust laws.7
A. AIRLINE MERGERS AFTER DEREGULATION
Congress enacted U.S. antitrust laws to protect consumers
harmed by a lack of competition in the market.8 The Deregula-
tion Act diverged from protecting the airlines to protecting con-
sumers.9 After the enactment of the Deregulation Act, Section 7
of the Clayton Act became the gatekeeper to mergers and acqui-
sitions within the airline industry, “restrain[ing] mergers only to
4 Congress transitioned away from command-and-control economic regula-
tions toward allowing competition to serve consumers. See Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978); see also Competition in the
Airline Industry, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 106th
Cong. 14 (1999) (testimony of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ Antitrust
Division) [hereinafter Testimony of Klein].
5 See Pub. L. No. 91-62, § 1(1), 83 Stat. 103 (amended 1969).
6 See Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 30(a), 92 Stat. 1731 (amended 1978). Courts inter-
preted the previous immunity to apply when: “(1) the conduct charged was ap-
proved by a specific order of the Board or was clearly contemplated by such an
order; and (2) the Board monitored and supervised the complained of conduct.”
Jerry L. Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & COM.
1001, 1011 (1980); see Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S.
363, 380–82 (1973).
7 Immunity from federal antitrust laws can now only be granted at the CAB’s
discretion as required in the public interest. Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 30(a), 92 Stat.
1731 (as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1384).
8 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); FED. TRADE
COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES, at 1 (2006) (explaining the core concern of antitrust laws focuses on the
“creation or enhancement of market power”).
9 Testimony of Klein, supra note 4, at 14.
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the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competi-
tion.”10 Congress enacted Section 7 of the Clayton Act to protect
competition rather than competitors and allowed the regulatory
agencies to prohibit mergers and acquisitions when “the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.”11 The Clayton Act sought to
address “incipient monopolies and trade restraints,” which the
Sherman Act lacked jurisdiction to regulate.12 The Clayton Act
merger regulations focus on preventing the occurrence of fu-
ture monopolies by blocking the formation of monopolies at the
onset, unlike the Sherman Act, which regulates already formed
monopolies or anticompetitive behaviors.13 Congress tasked the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ with the author-
ity to enforce the Clayton Act.14 While the Antitrust Division had
historically reviewed airline mergers after deregulation, the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) originally gained oversight
of airline mergers from the CAB.15 The DOT’s approval of two
airline mergers in the 1980s over the objections of the Antitrust
Division led to Congress turning over merger review authority to
the Antitrust Division in 1989.16
B. TOOLS OF AIRLINE MERGER ANALYSIS
The U.S. Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the mod-
ern-day merger analysis in Brown Shoe Co.17 It defined the rele-
vant product and geographic markets to determine the merger’s
probable effects on said markets and if competition would be
substantially lessened.18 The regulatory agencies, with the enact-
ment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
gained the authority to develop the rules for assessing the rele-
vant product and geographic markets and the effect on compe-
10 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 320; Testimony of Klein, supra note 4, at 14.
11 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 312–13, 320.
12 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 318 n.32.
13 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 318 n.32.
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (2012) (FTC authority); 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2012) (DOJ
authority).
15 See Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 26(a)(2) (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1982)).
16 Pub. L. No. 98-443, § 3(c) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(7) (1988)). The
Antitrust Division objected to the approval of two mergers, Trans World Airlines/
Ozark and Northwest/Republic, which would have created a monopoly over the
nonstop service between the respective hub cities and surrounding smaller cities.
Testimony of Klein, supra note 4, at 13–14.
17 See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 306–09.
18 Id. at 324.
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tition.19 The DOJ and FTC worked to promulgate the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger Guidelines) to provide
guidance to “the business community and antitrust practitioners
by increasing the transparency of the analytical process underly-
ing the Agencies’ enforcement decisions.”20 The DOJ and FTC
sought to avoid unnecessary interference with mergers that
might benefit competition or at least have no effect on competi-
tion.21 They focused on pinpointing the creation or enhance-
ment of market power through a merger.22
The DOJ has not promulgated a merger policy specific to the
airline industry or any one industry in particular.23 Rather, the
Merger Guidelines provide flexibility for the Antitrust Division
to assess a wide variety of mergers.24 The Merger Guidelines pro-
vide techniques to predict the prospective effects a merger may
have on competition and the ways the agencies define the rele-
vant markets.25 They seek to assess whether the merger would
“increase market power” of the newly merged company and if
the merger would allow the newly merged company “unilaterally
to raise price[s] or otherwise exercise market power” in ways
that negatively affect competition.26
Once the relevant product and geographic markets are deter-
mined, the Antitrust Division considers a variety of factors that
allows it to predict the likely competitive effects of a merger and
19 Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1(a)(2), 114 Stat. 2762, 15
U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b) (2000) (requiring mergers of a certain size to pre-notify the
governing enforcement agency before the merge occurs). The proposed merger
cannot occur until the expiration of a thirty-day waiting period after the pre-
notification, when the agency completes a review of the merger to decide
whether to allow it or challenge it, or by a waiver of the agency. See id.; COMMEN-
TARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 1, 3.
20 FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
at 1 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010].
21 COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 1.
22 Id.
23 J. Bruce McDonald, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST FOR AIR-
LINES 2 (2005) (speaking to the leaders of the Regional Airline Association about
the effects of airline bankruptcies, high fuel prices, and other problems in the
airline industry).
24 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 20, at 1–2.
25 COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2.
26 Id. at 3; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 20, at 2 (“A
merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to
raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as
a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives. In evaluating how a
merger will likely change a firm’s behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how
the merger affects conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”).
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any indications the merger may lessen competition.27 The gath-
ered evidence allows the Antitrust Division to analyze the
merger’s potential effect on the relevant market as well as “po-
tential adverse competitive effects,” entry barriers, “efficiencies,”
and “failing and exiting assets.”28 The Antitrust Division, how-
ever, does not apply the Guidelines in a sequential progression
starting with market definition and ending with failing assets.29
Rather, the Merger Guidelines provide an integrated approach,
which allows the Antitrust Division to include relevant pieces of
evidence depending on the circumstance of the merge.30
One of the indications used to determine the potential com-
petitive effects is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
which determines the market concentration and the potential
competitive effects on the post-merger market.31 The HHI in-
forms agencies of the likelihood the Antitrust Division will chal-
lenge a proposed merger.32 The HHI is calculated by adding the
squared market share of each competitor in the market.33 Based
on a scale from 0 to 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly),
unconcentrated markets have an HHI below 1,500, moderately
concentrated markets have an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500,
and highly concentrated markets have an HHI above 2,500.34
The post-merger concentration is measured by multiplying the
market share of the merging companies and then multiplying
the result by two.35 Small changes in concentration—increase in
the HHI less than 100 points—are unlikely to have adverse com-
petitive effects and will probably not be challenged.36 Moder-
ately and highly concentrated markets—increase in the HHI of
more than 100 points—“potentially raise significant competitive
concerns” and may get a second request for review if between
27 The evidence, drawn from the “Merging Parties,” “Customers,” and “Other
Industry Participants,” includes the “Actual Effects Observed in Consummated
Mergers,” “Direct Comparisons Based on Experience,” “Market Shares and Con-
centration in a Relevant Market,” “Substantial Head-to-Head Competition,” and
the “Disruptive Role of a Merging Party.” HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010,
supra note 20, at 2–5.
28 COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 The HHI also helps determine the market concentration of pre- and post-
merger markets. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 20, at 18–19.
32 Id. at 19.
33 Id. at 18.
34 Id. at 18 n.9, 19.
35 Id. at 19.
36 Id.
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100 and 200 points, while increases above 200 points have a pre-
sumption of a second request.37 “The higher the post-merger
HHI and the increase in the HHI,” the more potential competi-
tive concerns will arise and the more likely the Agencies will
challenge a proposed merge.38 The way the Agencies define the
relevant market provides the foundation for determining if a
merge will be challenged.39
III. THE EVOLVING ASSESSMENT OF THE RELEVANT
MARKET IN AIRLINE MERGER ANALYSIS
The Merger Guidelines provide the flexibility necessary to al-
low for a case-by-case, fact-specific analysis.40 Altering how the
relevant market is defined changes the analysis regarding
whether the DOJ will challenge an airline merge and how the
airlines can settle with the DOJ. The Antitrust Division has used
different ways to define the relevant product and geographic
markets, including city-pairs, code-sharing agreements, and run-
way slot allocations.
A. CITY-PAIRS AND CODE-SHARING AGREEMENTS
“City-pairs” are defined as airline services between departure
cities and arrival cities.41 City-pairs incorporate multiple airports
in a large metropolitan area into a single destination.42 The An-
titrust Division uses the city-pair approach to define the relevant
geographic market.43 Its rationale is that airline passengers have
predetermined destinations in mind when booking flights and
few passengers would fly to a different city than their desired
destination in response to a price increase.44 Code-share agree-
ments allow airlines to extend their own networks by using
flights operated by different airlines, increasing the city-pairs
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 18.
40 COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 3.
41 Amended Complaint at para. 26, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No.
1:13-cv-01236-CKK, 2013 WL 5411082 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter US Air-
ways Amended Complaint]. For example, departing from Dallas and arriving in
Chicago makes up the Dallas–Chicago city-pair. See id.
42 Jan K. Brueckner et al., Airline Competition and Domestic US Airfares: A Compre-
hensive Reappraisal, ECONS. TRANSP., Mar. 2013, at 1, 2.
43 See Amended Complaint at para. 26, United States v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No.
98-74611 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Northwest/Continental
Complaint].
44 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 26.
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that they can serve.45 The code-share agreements permit an air-
line to market and sell seats on flights operated by another air-
line.46 The benefit of code sharing lies in the ability for airlines
to “strengthen or expand their market presence and competi-
tive ability.”47 This expansion of city-pairs affects the relevant ge-
ographic markets as well as potential competitive effects.48
B. RUNWAY SLOTS
The Antitrust Division has also used runway slots to define the
relevant market.49 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regulates the allocation of runway slots at certain airports to
limit the number of flights going in and out.50 The FAA uses
take-off and landing slots as a way to manage air traffic at highly
congested airports “and to prevent repeated delays that result
from too many flights trying to take off or land at the same
time.”51 The FAA categorizes airports based on the degree of
congestion and potential for delays; the higher degree of con-
45 Code Sharing, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://
www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/licensing/code-sharing [https://
perma.cc/22S7-6CZD].
46 Complaint at 2, United States v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02377
(D.D.C. Dec. 06, 2016) [hereinafter Alaska Airlines–Virgin Airlines Complaint].
For example, a code-sharing agreement between Alaska Airlines and American
Airlines allows a passenger flying from Walla Walla, Washington to Charlotte,
North Carolina to book their ticket entirely through Alaska and fly on an Alaska
flight on the first connection and an American flight on the final connection. See
id. at 16.
47 Code Sharing, supra note 45. The DOT will consider the competitive impact a
code sharing agreement will have, but this only occurs prior to the agreement
going into effect. See id.
48 See Alaska Airlines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra note 46, at 10–11.
49 The runway slots “constitute a line of commerce, section of the country, and
relevant market within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.” US Airways
Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 31.
50 A runway slot is the ability to take off or land “at a particular airport on a
particular day during a specified time period.” Slot Administration – Slot Definition,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_of
fices/ato/service_units/systemops/slot_administration/slot_definition/ [https:/
/perma.cc/48ES-APZA] (last modified May 30, 2018). Slot administration is di-
vided into two seasons each year—Winter and Summer. Slot Administration – Slot
Allocation Process, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/slot_administration/slot_allo
cation_process/ [https://perma.cc/RN56-MD94] (last modified June 11, 2018).
51 Slot Administration – Slot Definition, supra note 50.
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gestion and potential for delays, the more oversight the FAA im-
poses on the airport.52
The FAA classifies a substantial majority of airports as Level 1
airports.53 Level 1 airports do not require slot control or a
schedule facilitator because they can manage their own flight
volume.54 In contrast, the FAA classifies the three most con-
gested airports in the country—John F. Kennedy International
Airport (JFK), LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in New York, and Ron-
ald Reagan National Airport (Reagan National) in Virginia—as
Level 3 airports,55 where it controls the allocation of runway
slots.56 The FAA allocates more slots to airlines who have histori-
cally held slots at the airports, creating a barrier for new airlines
to enter the slot regulated airport.57
In addition, the FAA has listed four other airports––Chicago
O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX), San Francisco International Airport (SFO), and
Newark Liberty International Airport (Newark Airport)––as
52 The three categories include: Level 1, which indicates that the airport has a
general ability to meet demand with no extensive pattern of delays; Level 2,
which indicates that the airport has certain periods of the day with the potential
for congestion and may require a schedule facilitator to ensure the scheduling is
within the airport’s capacity; and Level 3, which indicates that the airport’s infra-
structure cannot meet demand, will not be able to be improved to meet the de-
mand, and requires that the airport be subjected to slot controls to prevent the
significant possibility of delays. Slot Administration – Schedule Facilitation, FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/
service_units/systemops/slot_administration/slot_administration_schedule_facil
itation/ [https://perma.cc/34UJ-ZAXL] (last modified June 11, 2018).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Slot Administration – U.S. Level 3 Airports, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.
faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/
slot_administration/slot_administration_schedule_facilitation/level-3-airports/
[https://perma.cc/8YK2-5SMS]. FAA imposed slot control on JFK from 1968 to
2007. Congress terminated the constraints at JFK on January 1, 2007. After the
phase-out, the significant increase of operations caused significant congestion
and delays that negatively reverberated through the entire domestic air traffic. In
January 2008, a year after lifting the slot constraints, FAA re-imposed slot limits
on JFK. Operating Limitations at John F. Kennedy International Airport, 81 Fed.
Reg. 40167 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93). LGA slot controls
also expired on January 1, 2007, and were subsequently re-imposed December
2008. Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport, 81 Fed. Reg. 33126
(May 25, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
56 Slot Administration – Schedule Facilitation, supra note 52.
57 Slot Administration – U.S. Level 3 Airports, supra note 55. The first step for the
FAA to allocate Level 3 slots is for it to assess the historic slot data. Id.
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Level 2 airports.58 For this level, the airport and the FAA sched-
ule facilitator work together to ensure the airline carriers col-
laborate and mutually agree on the schedules and potential
limitations.59 Rather than first focusing on historic slot data, air-
line carriers at Level 2 airports provide a proposed schedule to
the FAA, which allows the carriers to remove potential flights if
they do not intend to operate in the next season.60
For the past thirteen years, the DOT has tracked a variety of
airport statistics for over 816 domestic airports.61 The depart-
ment tracks the number of passengers arriving and departing
from the airports, the scheduled flights and the carrier shares of
passengers, and on-time performance summaries for the time
period selected.62 This data allows conclusions to be drawn
about the current status of the airports, whether to increase the
classification levels of airports, and the ramifications after a
merger occurs.
When the FAA temporarily removed its long-standing slot
control over JFK and LGA between 2007 and 2008, the airline
carriers over-scheduled flights in and out of the New York City
airports to a point that it overwhelmed the capacity in the air-
ports that serve as a pass-through for nearly one third of the air
58 Slot Administration – U.S. Level 2 Airports, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.
faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/
slot_administration/slot_administration_schedule_facilitation/level-2-airports/
[https://perma.cc/RZP5-KZ9X]. The FAA lowered Newark Airport’s classifica-
tion from Level 3 to Level 2 on October 30, 2016. Newark Airport was classified as
a Level 3 airport in May 2008 in response to potential spillover delays caused by
the limitation of JFK airport during the summer season. FAA Announces Slot
Changes at Newark Liberty International, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/news/updates/?newsId=85309 [https://perma.cc/QF5T-RENF] (last modi-
fied Apr. 1, 2016).
59 The presence of a schedule facilitator has the effect of a carrot-stick ap-
proach: voluntarily cooperate to minimize delays by agreeing on schedules or
have the FAA trigger Level 3 controls. If the carriers refuse to cooperate with the
FAA by failing to seek and obtain schedule approval under the Level 2 process,
the carrier will not receive priority for historic slots if the airport subsequently
gains a Level 3 characterization. Slot Administration – U.S. Level 2 Airports, supra
note 58.
60 Id.
61 See Airport Statistics, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https:/
/www.transtats.bts.gov/NewAirportList.asp?xpage=airports.asp&flag=FACTS
[https://perma.cc/DAS7-BXK8].
62 About BTS, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.
bts.dot.gov/about-BTS [https://perma.cc/YK46-LP6S] (last updated July 25,
2018).
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traffic in the United States.63 JFK increased its scheduled depar-
tures by 21% in 2007.64 The 2007 percentages for JFK, LGA, and
Newark Airport averaged 71.5% on-time departures, 62% on-
time arrivals, and 3.46% cancellations in comparison to the na-
tional averages of 76.5%, 73.4%, and 2.16%.65 After the FAA
stepped back in and re-imposed its control of the runway slots,
the New York airports’ on-time percentages increased.66 How-
ever, when the FAA downgraded Newark Airport from a Level 3
to a Level 2 and gave more control to Newark Airport’s airline
carriers, the on-time percentages began to decrease.67 Capacity
issues within airports cause the FAA to subject the airports to
greater oversight, which, in turn, alters the way the Antitrust Di-
vision defines the relevant market.68
C. CITY-PAIR BASED APPROACH TO DEFINE THE RELEVANT
MARKET
Prior to the US Airways and American Airlines merger in
2013, the Antitrust Division defined the geographic markets pri-
63 LIYA WANG ET AL., ANALYSIS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR THE NEW YORK
METROPLEX: SUMMER 2007, at 1 (2008), http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu/pubs/
Wangetal_ICRAT_v8.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB9B-EPAE]; see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
64 Airport Statistics, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS., DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.
transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://perma.cc/YLU3-RJH9] (last up-
dated Sept. 15, 2018) (viewing New York, NY: John F. Kennedy International Air-
port (JFK) statistics from December 2007).
65 WANG ET AL., supra note 63, at 1. As of September 2018, the current on-time
national percentages are 80.7% departures, 80.12% arrivals, and 1.95% cancella-
tions. On-Time Performance – Flight Delays at a Glance, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS.,
DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/HomeDrillChart.asp [https://
perma.cc/4A72-JYWQ].
66 On-Time Performance – Flight Delays at a Glance, supra note 65 (averaging the
2017 on-time percentages of arrivals, departures, and cancellations).
Table 1
 Arrivals Departures Cancellation 
JFK 72.80% 75.64% 2.20% 
LGA 72.05% 75.80% 3.23% 
Newark (2017) 67.74% 73.42% 2.57% 
2017 Average 71.35% 74.95% 2.67% 
67 Newark Airport’s on-time arrival percentage for 2015, the last full year of its
Level 3 classification, was 9.01% better than it was in 2017. Id. (viewing Newark,
NJ: Newark Liberty International statistics from 2015 and 2017).
68 See US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 84.
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marily using the city-pair approach.69 The nonstop service to
each of the city-pairs defined the product market.70
1. 1993 US Air/British Airways Merger
In 1993, the Antitrust Division challenged the proposed code-
sharing agreement between USAir and British Airways on its
United States to London routes.71 The Antitrust Division found
the relevant geographic market to be the city-pairs of U.S. cities
with nonstop service to London.72 Additionally, it defined the
relevant product market as “nonstop scheduled airline passen-
ger service” between the American cities and London due to
nonstop service being “faster and more reliable” than connect-
ing service.73 Bilateral agreements between the United States
and the United Kingdom regulated the cities that could be gate-
way cities between the countries.74 Per the international agree-
ments, only gateway cities could have nonstop services.75 The
agreements placed an artificial limitation on the capacity of
flights between select cities in the United States and the United
Kingdom.76 USAir and British Airlines were the only airlines
that could provide nonstop service on the Philadelphia–London
route and were two out of three airlines that could provide non-
stop service on the Baltimore/Washington–London route.77 Ac-
cording to the DOJ, the proposed cooperation agreement on
the U.S.–London routes would lessen competition by creating a
disincentive to compete against one another on those routes in
order to protect each other’s profits and traffic along the
69 Impact of Consolidation on the Aviation Industry, with a Focus on the Proposed
Merger Between Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 29 (2008)
(James J. O’Connell explaining how the Antitrust Division evaluates the potential
competitive effects of airline mergers).
70 Testimony of Klein, supra note 4, at 14–15 (explaining how some airlines
service city-pairs on a nonstop basis and others on a connecting basis, which some
passengers will not entertain as a reasonable alternative to nonstop service).
71 Complaint at para. 16, United States v. USAir Grp., Inc., No. 93-0530
(D.D.C. Mar. 15, 1993) [hereinafter US Air–British Airlines Complaint].
72 Id. at para. 6 (concluding one-stop or connecting airline service fails to be a
substitute for nonstop service when passengers highly value their time).
73 Id. Connecting service is where passengers must stop or change planes at an
intermediate point. Id.
74 Id. at para. 9.
75 Id. The U.S. gateway cities included Philadelphia, Baltimore/Washington,
and Charlotte. Id. at para. 11.
76 Id. at para. 18.
77 Id. at para. 13.
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routes.78 Subsequently, USAir was ordered to divest each
U.S.–London route.79
2. 1998 Northwest Airlines/Continental Airlines Merger
The Antitrust Division challenged the merger of Northwest
Airlines and Continental Airlines in 1998.80 Before the proposed
merger, Northwest Airlines was the fourth largest airline in the
United States and Continental was the fifth largest.81 The air-
lines were each other’s most significant competitor, with stiff
competition related to prices and offered services.82 The airlines
competed vigorously along “hub-to-hub” routes and markets
that serve as connecting flights.83 The DOJ’s complaint asserted
that the merger would disincentivize both airlines from compet-
ing against each other and would deter Continental from ex-
panding in Cleveland.84 The merger proposed ceding a majority
of Continental’s voting rights to Northwest, creating an inter-
locking board of directors who would work for the benefit of
both airlines, and sharing the profits.85 In addition to merging
the voting rights and board of directors, the airlines entered
into a code-sharing agreement that provided for the joint mar-
keting of each other’s services.86
The DOJ argued that the relevant markets consisted of non-
stop routes between hub-to-hub city-pairs.87 If the merger oc-
curred, it alleged that Northwest and Continental would
78 Id. at para. 17. The Antitrust Division proposed USAir divest the authority to
provide nonstop service between select U.S. cities and London.
79 Final Judgment at 4, United States v. USAir Grp., Inc., No. 93-0530 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 1993).
80 The merger plan was to turn over a majority of Continental’s voting rights to
Northwest, creating a profit-sharing system. There would also be a joint board of
directors aiming to benefit both airlines. See generally Northwest/Continental
Complaint, supra note 43, at paras. 4, 16, 21–22.
81 Id. at para. 1.
82 Id. at para. 3.
83 The Antitrust Division had concerns about seven hub-to-hub routes that
served over 3.6 million passengers per year: Detroit, Memphis, and Minneapolis
for Northwest Airlines; and Cleveland, Houston, and Newark for Continental Air-
lines. Id. at para. 3.
84 Id. at para. 4.
85 Id. at paras. 21–22.
86 Id. at para. 23. The complaint noted that these agreements, called “Alliance
Agreements,” were common among airlines that sought to extend their networks
into and beyond their current capacity. This situation differed from usual busi-
ness because the alliance partners, Northwest and Continental, had substantial
equity ownership in each other. Id.
87 Id. at para. 31.
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overwhelmingly dominate nonstop service to the seven hub-to-
hub city-pairs.88 Of the seven hub-to-hub nonstop city-pairs, the
government alleged that the merged airline would not only con-
trol the nonstop service on five of the routes but also form mo-
nopolies on two other routes.89 According to the DOJ, barriers
to entry would exist because entering airlines lacked the cost
advantages of the established airlines and would face steep costs
to enter the market.90 In addition to increased costs, entering
airlines would have difficulty obtaining gates at the monopo-
lized airports and may not be able to offer the travel incentives
provided by the established airlines, such as expanding service
at the hubs or frequent flyer programs.91 Northwest Airlines and
Continental Airlines ultimately settled with the DOJ for Conti-
nental to buy back 6.7 million common shares, terminating
Northwest’s ability to influence Continental’s operations.92
88 Id. An estimated four million passengers would have been affected by the
merge. Id. at para. 33.
89 On certain routes, the combined airline would have had a monopoly over
nonstop flights. Id. at para. 31.
Table Two
Route NW Share  
of Nonstop  
Flights 
CO Share  
of Nonstop  
Flights 
Combined NW  
& CO Share of  
Nonstop Flights 
Detroit–Cleveland 54% 40% 94% 
Detroit–New York 70% 17% 87% 
Detroit–Houston 36% 64% 100% 
Cleveland–Minneapolis 53% 47% 100% 
Minneapolis–New York 80% 20% 100% 
Houston–Minneapolis 42% 58% 100% 
Houston–Memphis 39% 61% 100% 
90 These entry costs include the cost to build competing hubs in the same city,
which requires significant time and investment. Id. at para. 34.
91 Id. at para. 35. For an example of monopolization and attempts by an in-
cumbent airline at a hub to prevent new entries into their established market, see
United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 (D. Kan. 2001). American
Airlines was charged with violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act for attempting
to monopolize Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) by preventing
new entries. Id. at 1145–46.
92 The acting assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division stated the
settlement “will ensure that Northwest and Continental remain independent
competitors.” Northwest to Sell Stake, CNN MONEY (Nov. 6, 2000), https://
money.cnn.com/2000/11/06/deals/airlines_continental/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/4AUF-ZTRA].
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D. AIRPORT-BASED APPROACHES TO THE RELEVANT MARKET
The airline industry underwent significant consolidation be-
tween 2005 and 2015.93 In that time, the number of major air-
lines reduced from more than ten airlines to only five.94 This
mass consolidation led the Antitrust Division to alter its ap-
proach to analyzing proposed mergers. The Antitrust Division
began assessing airports when defining the relevant product and
geographic markets.95
1. Proposed 2013 American Airlines–US Airways Merger
The proposed merger between American Airlines and US Air-
ways had the potential to create the world’s largest airline.96 The
merger would also reduce the major domestic airlines from five
to four, which would handle eighty percent of domestic sched-
uled passenger service.97 As a result, on August 13, 2013, the
Antitrust Division challenged the proposed merger.98 For the
first time, the Antitrust Division factored individual airports into
its definition of the relevant market.99 It asserted that the pro-
posed merger constituted two relevant markets: one based on
93 See Brian Bostick, Timeline: Major U.S. Airline Merger Activity, 1950-2015, AVIA-
TION WK. NETWORK (Feb. 17, 2015), http://aviationweek.com/blog/timeline-ma
jor-us-airline-merger-activity-1950-2015 [http://perma.cc/CWZ8-SD8E].
94 Airline Mergers Since 2000, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/apps/g/page/business/airline-mergers-since-2000/398/ [https://
perma.cc/L3YA-GMMJ].
95 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at paras. 26, 29, 31; Com-
plaint at paras. 30, 32, United States v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 2:33-av-
00001 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter United–Delta Complaint]; Alaska Air-
lines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra note 46, at paras. 28–29.
96 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at paras. 1, 77.
97 Id. at para. 36. After the merger, the combined airline would serve millions
of customers and have 6,700 daily flights, 1,500 airplanes, and over 100,000 em-
ployees. Jad Mouawad, Merger of American and US Airways is Waved Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/business/airlines-
clear-final-merger-obstacle.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
98 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Law-
suit Challenging Proposed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines
(Aug. 13, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-anti
trust-lawsuit-challenging-proposed-merger-between-us-airways-and [https://
perma.cc/5VBW-Q6DT] (“This transaction would result in consumers paying the
price—in higher airfares, higher fees and fewer choices. Today’s action proves
our determination to fight for the best interests of consumers by ensuring robust
competition in the marketplace.”).
99 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at 31.
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city-pairs and the other based on takeoff and landing slots at a
particular airport.100
For the city-pair relevant market approach, the Antitrust Divi-
sion asserted that the domestic scheduled air passenger service
constituted the relevant product market because consumers
could not substitute the time savings and convenience of airline
travel for other forms of travel.101 The product market defini-
tion departed from its prior focus on the convenience of non-
stop service between city-pairs.102 The Antitrust Division
considered nonstop air service to particular airports within cities
in its discussion of the relevant geographic market.103 It not only
asserted that the relevant geographic market consisted of city-
pairs but also considered individual airports within the city-pairs
as a factor into the relevant market.104 The Antitrust Division
alleged the merger would create highly concentrated, presump-
tively anticompetitive markets in 1,000 city-pairs in which Ameri-
can Airlines and US Airways competed head-to-head for
customers.105 It also alleged that the concentration of the mar-
kets would probably lead to an increased likelihood of price rais-
ing, output reductions, and diminished quality of the services.106
The Antitrust Division, however, deviated from its normal as-
sessment of the relevant market by also defining it as the takeoff
and landing slots at Reagan National.107 It alleged that the run-
100 Id. at paras. 28, 31.
101 “[A] flight from Washington, D.C., to Detroit takes just over an hour of
flight time. Driving between the two cities takes at least eight hours. A train be-
tween the two cities takes more than fifteen hours.” Id. at paras. 24–25 (relying
on the theory that a “hypothetical monopolist of all domestic scheduled air pas-
senger service likely would increase its prices by at least a small but significant
and non-transitory amount”).
102 Compare US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 25, with
Northwest/Continental Complaint, supra note 43, at para. 25.
103 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 26.
104 “Some passengers prefer nonstop service because it saves travel time; . . .
others prefer service at a particular airport within a metropolitan area. For exam-
ple, most business customers traveling to and from downtown Washington prefer
service at Reagan National over other airports in the Washington, D.C.[,] metro-
politan area.” Id. at para. 29.
105 In over 1,000 city-markets, “the post-merger HHI would exceed 2,500
points and the merger would increase the HHI by more than 200 points.” Id. at
para. 38. The Antitrust Division calculated the HHI based on publicly available
nonstop and one-stop ticket revenues for 2012 from the DOT’s Airline Origin
and Destination Survey database. See id. at App. A.
106 Id. at para. 39.
107 Id. at para. 28 (defining a city-pair as comprising of a flight’s departure and
arrival cities). City-pairs, which include flights to all airports in and around rele-
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way slots constituted both the relevant product and geographic
market.108 At airports with slot controls, there are no alternatives
besides slot allocations for airlines to enter or expand their ser-
vice.109 The Antitrust Division’s reasoning for Reagan National
constituting the relevant geographic market highlighted its di-
vergence from the traditional city-pair approach. It alleged that
“[a]irlines do not view service at other [Washington, D.C.] air-
ports as adequate substitutes for service offered at Reagan Na-
tional for certain passengers.”110 It reasoned that consumer
preferences for services provided by airlines and for particular
airports within a city-pair could have an effect on competition
even within the city-pair.111 The Antitrust Division alleged con-
sumers preferred Reagan National due to its proximity to Wash-
ington, D.C. and direct service via the Metro.112
The Antitrust Division honed in on this consumer preference
for particular airports within metropolitan areas to alter its focus
from city-pairs to city-airport pairs and the potential competitive
effects a proposed merger would have on particular airports.113
This shifted the relevant market analysis to an airport-related
approach.114 The Antitrust Division recognized airlines may not
view services at other airports within a city-pair as adequate sub-
stitutes for services desired by certain passengers, just as con-
sumers prefer nonstop service due to its time savings and
convenience.115 It argued the merger of the slots at Reagan Na-
tional would cause a highly concentrated market and should be
presumed to be anticompetitive.116
vant cities, provide a broader approach than airport pairs to better account for
competition by low-cost carriers at adjacent airports. City Pairs, FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/airportpairs/ [https://perma.cc/
D5YZ-KEGK] (last modified Jan. 30, 2018); see, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner et al., City-
Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs: A Market-Definition Methodology for the Airline Industry, 44
REV. INDUS. ORG., Jan. 1, 2013, at 10–11.
108 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 31.
109 “Slots are expensive (often valued at over $2 million per slot), difficult to
obtain, and only rarely change hands between airlines.” Id. at para. 30; see also Slot
Administration – Schedule Facilitation, supra note 52.
110 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 31.
111 Id. at para. 29.
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See id. at paras. 9, 31.
115 This distinguishes the airports in the same area from each other. Id. at pa-
ras. 24, 29.
116 The Antitrust Division calculated the post-market HHI to be 4,959 points,
an increase in concentration of 1,493 points. Id. at para. 40.
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The Antitrust Division’s merger analysis of the potential
American Airlines/US Airways merge dove outside the world of
hypotheticals and analyzed the actual ramifications of past
mergers and their effect on growth and services, including the
2005 America West/US Airways merge, the 2008 Delta/North-
west Airlines merge, and the 2010 Southwest/SkyTran merge.117
It declined to accept the merged airlines’ arguments that reduc-
ing unused capacity by restricting growth or reducing estab-
lished services would lead to more efficient uses of resources
and lead to lower costs to consumers.118 Rather, the Antitrust
Division analyzed the data after previous mergers and argued
that increased consolidation caused “fewer flights and higher
fares.”119 It focused on statements by CEOs and CFOs of US Air-
ways expressing their desire to reduce their capacity in order to
increase their profits by reducing the number of airports and
hubs served.120
To allow the merger and to proceed with the creation of the
biggest airline in the United States, the Antitrust Division in-
novatively required US Airways and American Airlines to divest
slots and gates at certain congested airports.121 The divestment
was intended to boost competition across the domestic airline
industry by allowing low cost carrier airlines (LCCs) to provide
more choices and more competitive ticket prices for consum-
ers.122 This agreement provided LCCs with newly created foot-
holds at key airports.123 The settlement agreement required
significant divestiture or transfers of runway slots and gates at
certain airports including 104 runway slots at Reagan National,
117 Id. at paras. 62–65.
118 Id. at para. 59.
119 Id.
120 In 2007, US Airways’s CEO explained that a 4% reduction in capacity will
increase everyone’s industry profits. Also, in 2010, the US Airways CFO stated,
“We believe in the hub system. I just think there’s too many hubs. If you look
across the country, you can probably pick a few that are smaller hubs and maybe
duplicative to other hubs that airlines have that they could probably get out of.”
Id. at para. 62.
121 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Air-
ways and American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance




123 Id. (“The extensive slot and gate divestitures at these key airports are
groundbreaking[,] and they will dramatically enhance the ability of LCCs to com-
pete system-wide.”).
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34 slots at LGA, and 2 gates at Boston Logan, ORD, Dallas Love
Field, LAX, and Miami International.124 The settlement agree-
ment focused on access to airports rather than city-pairs and cre-
ated a new approach to analysis of airline mergers.
2. 2015 United–Delta Acquisition of Runway Slots at Newark
Airport
The next major litigation against an airline under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act centered on United Airlines’s attempt to
purchase runway slots at Newark Airport, a Level 3 airport at the
time, from Delta Airlines in 2015.125 United attempted to
purchase the slots under the veil of a permanent lease agree-
ment.126 When United proposed to acquire twenty-four slots
from Delta, it controlled 902 of the 1,233 allocated slots at New-
ark Airport.127 The Antitrust Division noted, “United’s slot hold-
ings dwarf those of its competitors,” with the next largest
competitor holding seventy slots.128 Even with its dominant hold
over the slots, United failed to utilize eighty-two slots per day,
more than the slots controlled by its competitors.129
The Antitrust Division argued anticompetitive effects would
occur in two relevant markets: (1) runway slots at Newark Air-
port, and (2) scheduled air service between Newark Airport and
other cities.130 In defining both of the relevant markets, the An-
titrust Division declined to distinguish the relevant product mar-
124 The settlement barred the newly merged American Airlines–US Airways
from reacquiring ownership in the divested or transferred slots and gates during
the settlement term. Id.
125 United–Delta Complaint, supra note 95, at para. 4; FAA Announces Slot
Changes at Newark Liberty International, supra note 58.
126 FAA rules prohibit the sale of Newark Airport runway slots. United and
Delta tried to circumvent the prohibition by creating a long-term, automatically
renewable lease. The Antitrust Division perceived this as an implied sale of the
slot to United. United–Delta Complaint, supra note 95, at para. 7.
127 United gained control of a substantial majority of slots when it merged with
Continental in 2010. To alleviate the DOJ’s concerns, United divested thirty-six
slots to Southwest Airlines and held Continental’s 894 slots. Since the merger,
United sought to reverse the divestiture by attempting to acquire slots from other
airlines, all of which the DOJ objected to—thirty-six slots from Southwest Airlines
in 2010, eighteen slots from American in March 2015, and now twenty-four slots
from Delta in June 2015. Id. at paras. 18–21.
128 The third largest slot holder, Delta, held sixty-four slots, and LCCs South-
west and JetBlue held thirty-six and thirty-three slots respectively. Id. at para. 18.
129 The Antitrust Division declined to accept United Airlines’s argument that it
would use the new slots to “provide service to a handful of new destinations and
add frequencies to existing routes.” Id. at paras. 23–24.
130 Id. at para. 28.
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ket from the relevant geographic market when it defined the
relevant market, similar to its analysis concerning Reagan Na-
tional’s slots in the 2013 American/US Airways merger.131 In ac-
cessing the relevant market with the slots, it alleged the slots
create stiff entry barriers for airlines seeking to enter or expand
service at Newark Airport since there are no alternatives to slots
and the allocated slots are difficult to obtain and “rarely change
hands.”132 Additionally, like in the 2013 American–US Airways
complaint, the Antitrust Division considered the preference of
airlines and consumer preference for services at Newark Airport
when defining both relevant markets.133 The Antitrust Division
ultimately argued that the merger would result in increased bar-
riers to entry and expansion, reduced service at Newark Airport,
and increased fares, leaving passengers with fewer choices.134
Antitrust concerns over runway slot controls ceased on April
1, 2016, when the FAA announced its plans to lift slot controls at
Newark Airport and reclassify it as a Level 2 airport.135 United
and Delta agreed to terminate their slot purchase agreement on
April 5, 2016, causing the DOJ to drop its case against the
merger.136
3. 2016 Alaska–Virgin Airlines Merger
The 2016 Alaskan Airlines and Virgin Airlines merger is the
latest consolidation within the airline industry.137 Alaska Airlines
and Virgin Airlines—respectively, the sixth- and ninth-largest
131 Id. at paras. 31–32; see also US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41,
at para. 31.
132 United–Delta Complaint, supra note 95, at paras. 29, 39.
133 “Airlines do not view service at other airports as reasonable substitutes for
service offered at Newark, and thus they are unlikely to switch away from slots at
Newark . . . .” Id. at para. 30.
Newark is the most convenient airport for passengers traveling to
or from locations in Northern New Jersey and portions of Manhat-
tan. Many passengers who live or work in these areas have a strong
preference for Newark over LaGuardia and JFK, do not consider
those other airports to be meaningful alternatives . . . .
Id. at para. 33.
134 Id. at paras. 41, 43.
135 FAA Announces Slot Changes at Newark Liberty International, supra note 58.
136 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines Abandons Attempt to En-
hance its Monopoly at Newark Liberty International Airport, (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-airlines-abandons-attempt-enhance-its-
monopoly-newark-liberty-international-airport [https://perma.cc/4B6S-HAZM].
137 U.S. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://airlines.org/
dataset/u-s-airline-mergers-and-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/T45C-ZCLS].
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airlines in the United States—sought to compete with the four
largest airlines.138 The merger would have allowed the com-
bined airlines to become the fifth largest airline in the United
States.139 The Antitrust Division’s relevant market analysis fol-
lowed its city-pair approach found in the 2013 American Air-
lines/US Airways merger: the relevant product market consisted
of scheduled air passenger service, and the relevant geographic
market consisted of city-pairs.140
The Antitrust Division held significant concerns regarding
Alaska Airlines’s close relationship with American Airlines, who
Virgin “aggressively competed with” on overlapping routes.141
Alaska Airlines and American Airlines closely aligned themselves
together through a code-sharing agreement, which was ex-
panded during the Antitrust Division’s assessment of the
merge.142 The expanded code-sharing agreement enabled
Alaska Airlines to market certain American Airlines flights on
over 250 routes and enabled American Airlines to market cer-
tain Alaska Airlines flights on eighty routes.143 The Antitrust Di-
vision alleged the code-sharing agreement incentivized Alaska
Airlines and American Airlines to cooperate.144 The Antitrust
Division alleged the code-sharing agreement created a disincen-
tive for Alaska Airlines to commence new services on routes
served by American Airlines or, alternatively, to compete less ag-
gressively on the shared routes.145
138 The major airlines—American Airlines, Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and
Southwest Airlines—accounted for over 80% of domestic air travel. Alaska Air-
lines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra note 46, at para. 1.
139 Id. at para. 1.
140 Id. at paras. 29–30; US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para.
25.
141 Alaska Airlines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra 46, at paras. 3–4, 24.
142 Id. at paras. 17–18.
143 The initial code-sharing agreement, formed in 1999, only allowed Alaska
Airlines to market American flights on eighty-eight routes. Id.
144 Some of the routes within the code-sharing agreement overlapped, and
both airlines offered competing nonstop services. The code-sharing agreement
called for both airlines to sell each other’s tickets on the overlapping routes,
providing the ability for the airlines to coordinate the offered services and facili-
tate collusion. Id. at paras. 19–20.
145 The Antitrust Division argued the code-sharing agreement provides Ameri-
can Airlines with significant leverage over Alaska Airlines because Alaska Airlines
“derives considerable value from using the American network to provide service
throughout many areas of the United States it does not otherwise serve,” while
American Airlines does not receive nearly as much value from the arrangement.
Id. at para. 21.
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At the same time the code-sharing agreements were expanded
to include more overlapping routes, Virgin Airlines provided
the “fiercest” competition against American Airlines on more
than twenty nonstop routes, many of which were in cities that
American maintains a hub.146 The Antitrust Division found it
“no coincidence” that Virgin Airlines aggressively competed
with American Airlines.147 Virgin Airlines received “essential and
scarce assets” to counteract the anticompetitive effects posed by
the 2013 American Airlines/US Airways merger.148 Virgin Air-
lines gained “a host of critical assets,” including airport gates
and take-off and landing rights at key airports like LAX, Dallas
Love Field, and Reagan National as a result of the settlement
agreement.149 This stiff competition on these routes forced
American Airlines to offer lower prices and provide better
service.150
The Antitrust Division alleged the code-sharing agreement be-
tween Alaska Airlines and American Airlines would likely have
an anticompetitive effect on the Virgin–American overlap
routes.151 It argued that new entry or expansion into the mar-
kets would be unlikely to remedy the anticompetitive effects.152
It alleged that significant entry barriers to airports exist includ-
ing “difficulty in obtaining access to slots and gate facilities” and
146 The twenty nonstop routes comprised approximately two-thirds of Virgin’s
entire network. Id. at paras. 24–25.
147 Id. at para. 26.
148 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Alaska Airlines
to Significantly Scale Back Codeshare Agreement with American Airlines in Or-
der to Proceed with Virgin America Acquisition (December 6, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-alaska-airlines-significantly-
scale-back-codeshare-agreement [https://perma.cc/2LKG-W75B] [hereinafter
Justice Department Requires Alaska Airlines].
149 Alaska Airlines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra note 46, at paras. 25–26.
150 For example, Virgin Airlines’s acquisition of the two gates at Dallas Love
Field allowed Virgin to aggressively compete with American Airlines and forced
American to lower prices, sometimes by more than fifty percent. Id. at para. 26.
151 The Antitrust Division alleged that if the merger is approved with the code-
sharing agreement, Alaska would likely “reduce capacity, decrease service quality,
and/or raise prices on these routes” and in some cases it “may completely stop
serving the routes with its own flights, instead simply marketing American’s
flights between the destinations.” Id. at para. 31.
152 Additional entry barriers include “the effects of corporate discount pro-
grams offered by dominant incumbents; loyalty to existing frequent flyer pro-
grams; an unknown brand; and the risk of aggressive responses to new entry by
the dominant incumbent.” Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v.
Alaska Air Grp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02377 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Com-
petitive Impact Statement].
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difficulty of the new entries “attracting sufficient local passen-
gers to support service” at airports that serve as another airline’s
hub.153 To remedy the likely anticompetitive effects, Alaska Air-
lines and Virgin Airlines entered into a consent decree with the
DOJ.154 The consent decree required Alaska Airlines to drasti-
cally reduce its code-sharing with American Airlines to “ensure
that [it] will have the incentive to vigorously compete with
American.”155 First, Alaska Airlines was barred from marketing
American flights (or allowing American to market Alaska
flights) on Virgin/American overlap routes.156 It also barred
Alaska Airlines from code-sharing on routes where Alaska would
otherwise likely launch new services that would compete against
American Airlines.157 Moreover, the settlement agreement re-
quired Alaska Airlines to seek approval before selling or leasing
any gates or slots that Virgin Airlines gained in the American
Airlines–US Airways divestiture two years prior, and Alaska Air-
lines was also barred from selling or leasing any part of the
divested slots or gates back to American Airlines.158 With the
consent decree, the DOJ allowed the merger of Virgin Airlines
and Alaska Airlines to proceed.159
IV. CURRENT RELEVANT MARKET APPROACH LACKS
THE ABILITY TO FULLY ASSESS A MERGER’S
COMPETITIVE IMPACT
A. CITY-PAIRS DEFINE THE RELEVANT MARKET TOO BROADLY
The airline industry has changed drastically since the Deregu-
lation Act. When deregulation occurred in 1978, 262 carriers
ferried over 9 million passengers to 1,710 city-pair markets and
transported over 320 million pounds of freight.160 As of January
2018, 99 airline carriers ferried 743 million passengers on well
153 Id.
154 Proposed Final Judgment at 1, United States v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., No.
1:16-cv-02377-RBW (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Alaska–Virgin Consent
Decree].
155 Id. at 5–6; Justice Department Requires Alaska Airlines, supra note 148.
156 Alaska–Virgin Consent Decree, supra note 154, at 5–6.
157 See id. The consent decree sought to reduce Alaska Airlines’s dependence
on the code-sharing agreement and limit Alaska Airlines’s incentives to cooper-
ate with American Airlines. Justice Department Requires Alaska Airlines, supra
note 148.
158 Alaska–Virgin Consent Decree, supra note 154, at 6.
159 Justice Department Requires Alaska Airlines, supra note 148.
160 Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics: 12 Months Ended June 30, 1978, CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BD., BUREAU OF OPERATING RIGHTS (June 30, 1980) at 1, https://
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over 7,000 domestic markets.161 However, of the ninety-nine air
carriers, six airlines—American (18.3%), Southwest (18.2%),
Delta (16.8%), United (14.9%), JetBlue (5.5%), and Alaska
(4.8%)—control nearly 80% of the domestic passenger share.162
Additionally, the rise of code-sharing agreements can lead to a
consolidation of routes like those that the Antitrust Division
held great concerns about in the 2016 Alaska Airlines/Virgin
Airlines merger.163
Due to these changes in the airline industry, defining the rele-
vant market solely based on the city-pair is no longer adequate
on its own to define the relevant market. The 2013 American
Airlines/US Airways merger analysis took a step in the correct
direction in factoring consumer preference for particular air-
ports in its city-pairs relevant market analysis.164 The value that
consumers place on their time and convenience influences their
preference to travel to certain places within cities, rather than
just the city in general.165 The traditional city-pair approach to
defining the relevant market captures an average of consumer
preferences for traveling to a particular city; it does not capture
those who seek to travel to specific airports within the cities.
Moreover, the city-pair approach fails to take account of
LCCs’ operation structures, which may have “focus cities” rather
than a hub-and-spoke network.166 The LCCs operate out of sec-
babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024410295;view=1up;seq=1 (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2018).
161 Airline Activity: National Summary (U.S. Flights), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATIS-
TICS, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/4FP7-
2E84]; Fast Fact Sheet: City Pair Program (CPP) FY18 Contract Awards, U.S. GEN.
SERVS. ADMIN. (July 2017), https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/CPP_FY18_Fast_Facts.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YC3H-YELY] (describing a General Services Administra-
tion program that offers discounted air fares through eight airlines—United,
American, Delta, Southwest, JetBlue, Hawaiian, Alaska, and Silver Airways—to
7,257 domestic markets).
162 Airline Domestic Market Share February 2017–January 2018, BUREAU OF TRANSP.
STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/7J9F-D3NV].
163 See Alaska Airlines–Virgin Airlines Complaint, supra note 46, at para. 31. For
a list of code-sharing agreements in effect, see generally Code Share Report, DEP’T
OF TRANSP. (Feb. 2018), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/
docs/mission/office-policy/aviation-policy/9141/february-2018-code-share-re
port_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU5L-7JDM].
164 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 29.
165 Id. at para. 25.
166 Virgin Airlines has focus cities from which it furnishes nonstop services to
many destinations. These focus cities are not used by Virgin to transfer large
quantities of connecting traffic. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 152, at
4.
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ondary airports within large metropolitan areas, otherwise
called “adjacent airports.”167 In 2009, travel to or from thirty-
seven airports—primary airports to selected metropolitan areas,
adjacent airports, and fringe airports—accounted for two-thirds
of all domestic passenger trips.168 Examples of adjacent airports
include Dallas Love Field,169 Chicago Midway International,170
Houston Hobby,171 Oakland International,172 Burbank Air-
port,173 St. Petersburg Clearwater International,174 and Washing-
167 Brueckner et al., Airline Competition and Domestic U.S. Airfares, supra note 42,
at 1.
168 Brueckner et al., City-Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs, supra note 107, at 4.
Table Three
Primary airport other core airports fringe airports 
Boston BOS MHT, PVD   
Chicago ORD MDW   
Cincinnati CVG DAY   
Cleveland CLE CAK   
Dallas DFW DAL   
Detroit DTW FNT   
Houston IAH HOU   
Los Angeles LAX BUR, LGB SNA, ONT 
Miami MIA FLL PBI 
New York LGA EWR, JFK HNP, ISP 
San Francisco SFO OAK, SJC   
Tampa TPA PIE SRQ 
Washington, DC DCA IAD, BWI   
169 Adjacent to DFW, and Southwest Airlines controls 91.96% of the passenger
share. Dallas, TX: Dallas Love Field (DAL), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://
www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://perma.cc/NK6A-C6R5].
170 Adjacent to Chicago O’Hare, and Southwest Airlines controls 95.77% of
the passenger share. Chicago, IL: Chicago Midway International (MDW), BUREAU OF
TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://
perma.cc/5RVC-N7FR].
171 Adjacent to George Bush Intercontinental Airport, and Southwest Airlines
controls 92.96% of the passenger share. Houston, TX: William P Hobby (HOU), BU-
REAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1
[https://perma.cc/9NE8-EZSZ].
172 Adjacent to San Francisco International Airport, and Southwest Airlines
controls 72.74% of the passenger share. Oakland, CA: Metropolitan Oakland Inter-
national (OAK), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/air-
ports.asp?pn=1 [https://perma.cc/H4US-3JTV].
173 Adjacent to LAX, and Southwest Airlines controls 73.28% of the passenger
share. Burbank, CA: Bob Hope (BUR), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://
www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://perma.cc/2PPR-5SRC].
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ton International Thurgood Marshall.175 The Antitrust Division,
in its analysis of the 2013 American Airlines/US Airways relevant
market, began considering consumer preferences for city-pairs
but not to the level needed to capture the full picture.
The city-pair approach also fails to take into account the prac-
tices of merged airlines to reduce their capacity, subsequently
reducing competition at certain airports and hubs.176 The tradi-
tional method of defining the relevant market through city-pairs
fails to consider the competitive effect the merger will actually
have on airports. In the wake of previous mergers, airlines signif-
icantly cut back service and took down airline hubs.177 From
2007 to 2012, major airlines reduced scheduled flights by up to
18%.178 In contrast, the LCCs and Southwest Airlines increased
their scheduled flights by 41%.179 Post-merger downsizing has
led to severe reductions in service to some airports, including a
63.1% decrease at Delta’s Cincinnati hub, a 40.1% decrease at
US Airways’s Pittsburgh hub, and a 35.5% decrease at North-
west’s Memphis hub.180
B. SLOT-CONTROL CAN RARELY BE USED TO DEFINE THE
RELEVANT MARKETS
If the Antitrust Division limits itself to assessing only FAA-im-
posed capacity restraints to determine the anticompetitive effect
174 Adjacent to Tampa International, and Allegiant Airlines controls 100% of
the passenger share. St. Petersburg, FL: St Pete Clearwater International (PIE), BUREAU
OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://
perma.cc/5F6Z-4YJF].
175 Adjacent to Reagan National, and Southwest Airlines controls 69.59% of
the passenger share. Baltimore, MD: Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood
Marshall (BWI), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/air-
ports.asp?pn=1 [https://perma.cc/TNX6-GRC7].
176 US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at para. 4.
177 DIANA L. MOSS, AM. ANTITRUST INST., DELIVERING THE BENEFITS? EFFICIEN-






178 The major airlines are American, United, Alaska, US Airways, AirTran, and
Delta. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Aviation Industry Perform-
ance: A Review of the Aviation Industry, 2008–2011, App. Fig. 23, at 28 (Sept. 24,
2012), https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Aviation%20Indus-
try%20Performance%5E9-24-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M37-4TAL].
179 The LCCs include Allegiant, Spirit, JetBlue, and Frontier. Id.
180 Id. at 12.
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of an airline merger, it will grossly limit the markets it can re-
view. At the time the Antitrust Division completed its competi-
tive assessment of United’s attempt to buy Delta’s runway slots at
Newark Airport, the FAA controlled the amount flights in and
out of Newark Airport by categorizing it as a Level 3 airport.181
The FAA’s capacity control regulations for Level 3, and even
Level 2, airports create entry barriers for airlines to expand or
enter the market.182 However, the FAA regulates the capacity of
only a miniscule number of airports in the United States: three
at Level 3 and four at Level 2.183 The airports for which the FAA
imposes capacity regulations account for less than 1% of com-
mercial airports in the United States.184
In the future, the number of airports whose capacity is regu-
lated by the FAA may increase with the increased number of
passengers flying within the United States. The International Air
Transport Association projects that 7.8 billion people per year
will use air travel by 2036, doubling from the 4 billion passen-
gers that traveled by plane in 2017.185 Passengers on U.S. flights
increased nearly 3% in the span of one year, totaling approxi-
mately 743 million passengers.186 While the Antitrust Division
should include consumer preference for a particular airport to
define the relevant market, it should apply a different analysis
for airports whose capacity is not regulated by the FAA.
V. A HYBRID AIRPORT-RELATED/CITY-PAIR ANALYSIS IN
THE MODERN AGE
As the airline industry becomes more consolidated, the Anti-
trust Division will need to incorporate airports into the relevant
market definition. The city-pair approach can continue to be
used to define the relevant market, especially on the routes with
only one airport within a city.187 However, the Antitrust Division
181 FAA Announces Slot Changes at Newark Liberty International, supra note 58.
182 See Slot Administration – Schedule Facilitation, supra note 52.
183 Slot Administration – U.S. Level 3 Airports, supra note 55; Slot Administration –
U.S. Level 2 Airports, supra note 58.
184 Combined, Level 2 and Level 3 airports account for 0.85% of commercial
airports in the United States. See Airport Statistics, supra note 61.
185 Simon Meyer, Why the Aviation Sector Cannot Build Itself Out of the Capacity
Crisis, INT’L AIRPORT REV. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.internationalairportre-
view.com/article/67140/aviation-capacity-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/5J7M-
58KF].
186 Airline Activity: National Summary (U.S. Flights), supra note 161.
187 For example, McCarran International Airport is the only commercial air-
port to serve Las Vegas. See Las Vegas, NV: McCarran International (LAS), BUREAU
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should analyze airports within certain city-pairs that have multi-
ple airports with differing consumer demand. For city-pairs that
have more than one commercial airport highly sought by con-
sumers, the Antitrust Division should include a second relevant
market definition in its analysis.188
A. TARGETING AIRPORTS FOR THE AIRPORT-RELATED RELEVANT
MARKET ANALYSIS
The FAA already has a system in place that the Antitrust Divi-
sion could use to determine which cities need a more narrowly
defined relevant market: data from its NextGen modernization
program.189 The FAA has identified twenty-one metroplexes—
geographic areas that include several commercial and general
aviation airports in close proximity serving large metropolitan
areas—for its modernization program and prioritized thirteen
of the metroplexes.190 The FAA targeted the particular me-
troplexes because “improved performance could benefit not
only the region, but the entire [National Airspace System].”191
The FAA lists the airports within each of the metroplexes in its
analysis.192
The Antitrust Division can use the FAA’s breakdown of the
different metroplexes to limit the scope of individual airports it
will want to analyze as a separate relevant market. The priori-
tized metroplexes contain seventy-two airports, and the Antitrust
Division can reduce that number further, if it desires, by deter-
OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/airports.asp?pn=1 [https://
perma.cc/8BCJ-JEA6].
188 See US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at paras. 27, 29, 31.
189 The FAA implemented its NextGen program in 2007 to modernize the U.S.
air transportation system with the goal of increasing the “safety, efficiency, capac-
ity, predictability, and resiliency” of aviation in the United States. What is
NextGen?, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
what_is_nextgen/ [https://perma.cc/U54Q-NWVR] (last modified May 7,
2018). The FAA implements “innovative technologies, capabilities, and proce-
dures” to modernize the aviation industry. Id.
190 Metroplexes, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snap-
shots/metroplexes/ [https://perma.cc/AWV9-YUFV] (last modified Sept. 7,
2018) (follow “List of Metroplex locations”).
191 Id. The prioritized metroplexes include: Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleve-
land–Detroit, D.C., Denver, Houston, Las Vegas, North Texas, Northern Califor-
nia, South Central Florida, and Southern California. Id.
192 See, e.g., Metroplex – Houston, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/
nextgen/snapshots/metroplexes/?locationId=9 [https://perma.cc/JHL7-4ZCR]
(last modified July 14, 2018) (The Houston Metroplex contains David Wayne
Hooks Memorial Airport, William P. Hobby Airport, George Bush Intercontinen-
tal Airport, and Sugar Land Regional Airport.).
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mining which airports serve above a certain amount of passen-
gers.193 Even if the Antitrust Division decides to assess the HHI
for the seventy-two airports within the metroplexes, it would
take less time compared to the 1,008 city-pairs analyzed in the
2013 American Airlines–US Airways merger.194 The FAA has al-
ready used time and resources to pinpoint areas where it has
greater concerns about capacity so it can make improvements, a
process similar to when it established slot controls.195
The Antitrust Division can save its resources and build off the
work already completed by the FAA. It can use the metroplexes
highlighted by the FAA as a basis for determining consumer de-
mand for each of these airports. The Antitrust Division has al-
ready analyzed Washington, D.C., which the FAA has identified
as a metroplex, and has determined which airports consumers
seek to depart from and travel to.196
Once the Antitrust Division defines the relevant market based
on the airport, it can use data gathered by the DOT to deter-
mine the market power at the individual airports.197 For exam-
ple, Southwest Airlines controls 91.96% of the market share at
Dallas Love Field, an airport within the North Texas Me-
troplex,198 and 69.59% of the market share at Baltimore/Wash-
ington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, an airport
within the Washington, D.C., metroplex.199 The airline with the
next highest share at the Baltimore airport is Spirit Airlines, and
it only provides service for 7.66% of the passengers in Balti-
more.200 Additionally, the Antitrust Division could assess passen-
ger preferences for which airports passengers prefer within a
certain metroplex if the FAA or those in the airline industry
193 See Metroplexes, supra note 190.
194 See US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at App. A.
195 See Metroplexes, supra note 190.
196 See US Airways Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at paras. 30–31; Me-
troplex – D.C., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/
metroplexes/?locationId=7 [https://perma.cc/BBJ4-GYPN] (last modified Sept.
7, 2018).
197 See Airline Activity: National Summary (U.S. Flights), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATIS-
TICS, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/C5H8-N9C7].
198 Dallas, TX: Dallas Love Field (DAL), supra note 169; Metroplex – North Texas,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/metroplexes/
?locationId=6 [https://perma.cc/W92U-CNY4] (last modified Sept. 7, 2018).
199 Baltimore, MD: Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall (BWI),
supra note 175; Metroplex – D.C., supra note 196.
200 Baltimore, MD: Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall (BWI),
supra note 175; Metroplex – D.C., supra note 196.
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have not already conducted this assessment.201 Booking data
and passenger choice surveys can help establish consumer
preferences.202
B. NON-SLOT ENTRY BARRIERS TO DETERMINE AN
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT AT AIRPORTS
The Antitrust Division can still assess the anticompetitive ef-
fects of a merger by analyzing factors at the airport itself once
the agency defines the relevant market as a particular airport.
Slot controls are not the only entry barriers that airlines face
when trying to enter a new airport. The airports themselves
might create entry barriers in the way they allocate gates and
terminal space.
Deregulation has not made the process easier for airlines to
gain access to airports even though the litmus test to certify new
airlines has been made easier.203 Incumbent airlines can use
their established foothold within airports to deter the entry of
new airlines.204 This could be done by limiting the amount of
gate space available, either through long-term exclusive leasing
of the gates or by preventing the airports from expanding their
capacity by building more facilities.205
The Antitrust Division can analyze facilities lease agreements
between the airport and the merging airlines to determine the
anticompetitive effects of a merger.206 Some airlines have exclu-
sive lease agreements with airports that allow an airline to con-
trol the use of certain airport facilities and prevent any other
airline from accessing those facilities.207 While airports have be-
gun to incorporate additional ways to terminate the exclusive
agreements when an airline under-utilizes a facility, the Anti-
201 Consumer choice surveys may establish which airports are preferred.
202 One model, using booking data, found that distance played a factor in
where passengers preferred to fly from. For every 1% increase in distance, the
likelihood of the passenger flying from that airport decreased by 4%. Another
study found that the “surface-access” journey time is a key determinative factor in
airport preference. James Wiltshire, Airport Competition, 1.2 INT’L AIR TRANSP.
ASS’N ECON. BRIEFING, no. 11, at 13–14 (2013).
203 John Sabel, Airline–Airport Facilities Agreements: An Overview, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 769, 778 (2004).
204 Id. at 779.
205 Id.
206 The key elements of leases and how they affect entry include exclusivity of
use, the length of the contract, and the ability it may give the airline to prevent
airport construction projects in the form of “majority-in-interest” clauses. See id. at
776, 782, 787.
207 The facilities include terminal space and gates. Id. at 785.
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trust Division can still assess the agreements currently in
effect.208
Additionally, the long terms of leases force new airlines to
wait until the lease either expires or the airport determines a
facility is under-utilized before they can access the related air-
port facilities, which can take time on its own. Lease agreements
for airport facilities traditionally span from fifteen to thirty
years, and state law allows some agreements to continue
longer.209
Thus, the terms of the lease agreements with the airports can
indicate the ability for future airlines to enter or expand in an
airport. Combining the agreements made by airlines before a
merger occurs can have a disproportionate impact on competi-
tiveness because the incumbent airlines could have an even
stronger foothold within airports that consumers might prefer
over others in the nearby area. The Antitrust Division has begun
to assess gate access for LCCs in markets with stiff entry barriers,
but it should continue to scrutinize access at airports beyond
just slot controls.210
VI. CONCLUSION
With the consolidation of major airlines into a group of only
five and consumers seeking more specific services, it is time the
Antitrust Division adjusts how it defines the relevant markets.
Consumers no longer seek out tickets to particular cities if they
have other options; rather, they will seek to save time and travel
to airports within cities. For certain cities with more than one
airport that consumers are willing to travel to and from, the An-
titrust Division should not only use city-pairs to define the rele-
vant market. The airport itself should constitute its own relevant
market. This approach will allow the Antitrust Division to obtain
a fuller assessment of the anticompetitive impact of future air-
line mergers.
208 DFW incorporated a clause in its agreements for gates in its new terminal to
allow another carrier to use the unused facilities of the tenant airline. Id. at 787;
Bryon Okada, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Wants to Shorten Exclusive-Use Gate Leases,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 19, 2003, at 8B.
209 For example, New York state law allows lease agreements not to exceed
forty years. Sabel, supra note 203, at 787.
210 The disruptive gate divestitures at Boston Logan, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas
Love Field, LAX, and Miami International served to expand service to airports
with entrenched, traditional carriers. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra
note 152, at 10–12; Alaska–Virgin Consent Decree, supra note 154, at 3–4, 6.
